We would like to thank the commentators for their generous comments, valuable insights and helpful suggestions. We begin this response by discussing the selfishness axiom and the importance of the preferences, beliefs, and constraints framework as a way of modeling some of the proximate influences on human behavior. Next, we broaden the discussion to ultimate-level (that is evolutionary) explanations, where we review and clarify gene-culture coevolutionary theory, and then tackle the possibility that evolutionary approaches that exclude culture might be sufficient (...) to explain the data. Finally, we consider various methodological and epistemological concerns expressed by our commentators. (shrink)

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of (...) small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life. Key Words: altruism; cooperation; cross-cultural research; experimental economics; game theory; ultimatum game; public goods game; self-interest. (shrink)

The current ethical norms of genomic biobanking creating and maintaining large repositories of human DNA and/or associated data for biomedical research have generated criticism from every angle, at both the practical and theoretical levels. The traditional research model has involved investigators seeking biospecimens for specific purposes that they can describe and disclose to prospective subjects, from whom they can then seek informed consent. In the case of many biobanks, however, the institution that collects and maintains the biospecimens may not itself (...) be directly involved in research, instead banking the biospecimens and associated data for other researchers. Moreover, the future uses of biospecimens may be unknown, if not unknowable, at the time of collection. Biobanking may thus stretch the meanings of inform and consent to their breaking point: if you cannot inform subjects about what their biospecimens will be used for, what can they consent to? Given that informed consent by individual subjects is the ethical gold standard, the seeming dilution of the concept in the context of biobanking is a profound problem. (shrink)

The development of factor markets has opened Chinese agriculture for the penetration of capitalism. This new round of rural transformation—China’s agrarian transition— raises the agrarian question in the Chinese context. This study investigates how capitalist forms and relations of production transform agricultural production and the peasantry class in rural China. The authors identify six forms of nonpeasant agricultural production, compare the labor regimes and direct producers’ socioeconomic statuses across these forms, and evaluate the role of China’s land-rights institution in shaping (...) these forms. The empirical investigation presents three main findings: Peasant differentiation : capitalist forms of agricultural production differentiate peasants into a variety of new class positions. Market-based stratification: producers in capitalist agriculture are primarily stratified by their positions in labor and land markets; their socioeconomic statuses are linked with their varying degrees of proletarianization. Institutional mediation: rural China’s dual-track land system plays a crucial role in shaping the diverse and unique forms of capitalist production. (shrink)

Andres Bonifacio is a household name in the history of the Philippines.His name has been included into many discussion and controversies revolvingover his identity as the Father of the Revolution and being the founder ofKataastaasang, Kagalanggalangag Katipunan . His poems serve as legaciesthat can unlock what kind of person is Andres. Through his poems, he expressedreflections about the situation of the Indios during the time of colonization andthe rage of the revolution. This descriptive study analyzed four selected poemsof Andres Bonifacio (...) and sought to find a new insight into the poems through a Neo-Marxist perspective using a Neo-Marxist lens, specifically the theory of cultural hegemony by Antonio Gramsci. Based on the content analysis of hispoems, it was found out that Bonifacio was affected by the false consciousnesspropagated by the colonizers during the Spanish settlement in the country. Italso answered the question whether Bonifacio is a patriotic man or a nationalistichero. Keywords: Literature, revolution, neo-marxism, poems, Andres Bonifacio, descriptiveresearch, Philippines. (shrink)

Individuals higher on avoidant coping may remember fewer specific autobiographical memories and more nonspecific memories on the Autobiographical Memory Test in order to protect themselves from the painful emotions accompanying some specific memories. Habitually remembering this way may be a risk factor for depression. In Studies 1 and 2, avoidant coping was associated with more specific memories and fewer overgeneral memories, at odds with the functional avoidance view. In Study 3, there were no significant relationships between AMT indices and avoidant (...) coping. Results are discussed in light of ironic process theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Rawls's Originary Theory of JusticeEric Gans (bio)The fundamental thesis of generative anthropology is that the principal concern of human culture is and has been from the outset to defer the potential violence of mimetic desire. To this mode of thought, constructing a model of the good society in any but the general terms of "exchange" and "reciprocity" is unfaithful to the human community, whose operations have been (...) from the beginning beyond the grasp of any individual mind within the society, and in which since the rise of the market system we participate largely unmediated by ritual. Rather than providing a template for the "good society," originary thinking provides a touchstone for ethical progress: act so as to contribute to reciprocal exchange, negatively, by aiding those who need help to participate in the exchange system more fully, and positively, by creating new foci of desire that enrich the system of exchange, the circulation of desire and satisfaction. The result of these acts is to reduce or "defer" resentment, negatively, by removing grievances, and positively, by creating new opportunities for recycling resentment into productive activity.These precepts notwithstanding, the "moral model" of reciprocal exchange, as exemplified in the exchange of signs around the sacred center in the hypothetical originary event, provides the basis for a recurrent temptation to create utopias. The theoretical gesture of measuring a given social order against a moral ideal is an extension of the moral intuition we apply in judging all human actions; whatever our degree of resignation, we cannot help but resent any suggestion—even when it is "objectively" false—that we have been victims of a failure of reciprocity. Both the theory and the personal intuition are direct descendants of the originary exchange of representations, as are the moral "theories" that are explicitly grounded in the sacred. Abstract moral theorizing must ultimately appeal to either transcendence or intuition, and the appeal to the former differs only in its rhetoric from the appeal to the latter.Finally, these "timeless" reflections must be situated in history. Determining the proper relationship between universal morality and historically [End Page 149] particular ethics poses a particularly acute problem in the postmodern era. The question that has remained with us since the end of World War II is how to overcome the paralysis of Auschwitz—how to acknowledge the necessary deferral of reciprocity without condoning genocide. If we hold history's institutions to the touchstone of the moral model, they will always be found wanting, yet this historical experience tells us that if we do not so hold them, anything is possible. The fact that accusations of Nazism (or "fascism") continue to be made today—notably against Israel itself—is a sign that the moral dilemma has not yet been resolved. But unlike metaphysical thought, originary thinking takes the Holocaust as a sign not of the need to construct a social model that will resolve this dilemma, but of the inappropriateness of confronting it directly. Making the world a better place not only does not require but is in fact incompatible with a prior image of the world made good.The most serious attempt by mainstream Anglo-American social thought to grapple with this postmodern quandary is that of the late Harvard philosopher John Rawls (1921–2002), whose A Theory of Justice (1971) remains the era's most important work of moral philosophy. To sum up in my own terms Rawls's basic idea: if we imagine ourselves in an "original position" when society has not yet come into existence, so that our (future) place in it is hidden from us by a "veil of ignorance," then we will be able to agree on the criteria of a good society, since our uncertainty will convince us all equally of the necessity to protect ourselves from unfairness in the event we are assigned one of society's less desirable roles. We may then accept this imaginary agreement, unbiased by the participants' knowledge of their eventual social role, as universal humanity's most just arrangement. Rawls considers that under these conditions any inequality in the overall distribution of social goods can be justified only if it produces a margin of... (shrink)

This paper intends to append the frame of dialectic upon St. John of the Cross’ delineation of mysticism. Its underlying hypothesis is that the dialectical structuring of St. John’s mystical theology promises to unravel the web of relational concepts embedded within his immense writings on this unique phenomenon. It is hoped that as a consequence of this undertaking, relevant pairs of correlative opposites that figure prominently in mysticism can be elucidated and perhaps come to some form of resolution.

This paper endeavours to unravel the dialectical structure embedded within St. John of the Cross’ delineation of the phase of purgation in the economy of mysticism. Two correlative opposites that figure prominently in some systems of theistic mysticism are infinite-finite and grace-effort. The premise of this paper is that those pairings are not dichotomous contraries but are opposites that are amenable to some form of reconciliation. With the aid of a triadic dialectical scheme it is possible to map out (...) the dialectical relations between relevant concepts within mystical purgation, characterized as ‘night’ by St. John, and perhaps achieve some advance in the elucidation of the pairings’ constitutive elements. (shrink)

This paper intends to append the frame of dialectic upon St. John of the Cross’ delineation of mysticism. Its underlying hypothesis is that the dialectical structuring of St. John’s mystical theology promises to unravel the web of relational concepts embedded within his immense writings on this unique phenomenon. It is hoped that as a consequence of this undertaking, relevant pairs of correlative opposites that figure prominently in mysticism can be elucidated and perhaps come to some form of resolution.

The making of infrared templates is of great significance for improving the accuracy and precision of infrared imaging guidance. However, collecting infrared images from fields is difficult, of high cost, and time-consuming. In order to address this problem, an infrared image generation method, infrared generative adversarial networks, based on conditional generative adversarial networks architecture is proposed. In I-GANs, visible images instead of random noise are used as the inputs, and the D-LinkNet network is also utilized to build the generative model, (...) enabling improved learning of rich image textures and identification of dependencies between images. Moreover, the PatchGAN architecture is employed to build a discriminant model to process the high-frequency components of the images effectively and reduce the amount of calculation required. In addition, batch normalization is used to optimize the training process, and thereby, the instability and mode collapse of the generated adversarial network training can be alleviated. Finally, experimental verification is conducted on the produced infrared/visible light dataset. The experimental results reveal that high-quality and reliable infrared data are generated by the proposed I-GANs. (shrink)

We study a joint pricing and inventory control problem for perishables with positive lead time in a finite horizon periodic-review system. Unlike most studies considering a continuous density function of demand, in our paper the customer demand depends on the price of current period and arrives according to a homogeneous Poisson process. We consider both backlogging and lost-sales cases, and our goal is to find a simultaneously ordering and pricing policy to maximize the expected discounted profit over the planning horizon. (...) When there is no fixed ordering cost involved, we design a deep reinforcement learning algorithm to obtain a near-optimal ordering policy and show that there are some monotonicity properties in the learned policy. We also show that our deep reinforcement learning algorithm achieves a better performance than tabular-based Q-learning algorithms. When a fixed ordering cost is involved, we show that our deep reinforcement learning algorithm is effective and efficient, under which the problem of “curse of dimension” is circumvented. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show the relationship between John XXIII and Robert K. Greenleaf’s understanding of leadership. By taking into consideration Greenleaf’s theory of servant-leadership – from conceptualization to model development – and Larry Spears’ influential rubric of ten servant-leadership characteristics, we will show how servant-leadership theory goes in line with that of John XXIII when both are based on a notion of the common good and human dignity.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE SUBSTANTIAL UNITY OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES ACCORDING TO JOHN POINSOT JOHN D. KRONEN The University of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota EVERY SUBSTANCE metaphysician must answer several difficult questions peculiar to his or her ontology. In this paper I will examine John Poinsot's answer to two of these questions, one concerning the nature of the form of substantial composites, and one concerning which material objects are (...) substantial composites. I shall argue that Poinsot's answers to these questions show the untenability of a structuralist view of substantial form and of a reductive materialist view of living beings. But before considering these questions I must briefly outline Poinsot's view of what the general nature of substance is, as explained in his treatise on material logic.1 Poinsot's Account of Substance in General In the section of his Material Logic concerned with the categories Poinsot gives a succinct account of the nature of substance 1 Cursus Philosophicus thomisticus; vol. I, Ars logicae prima et secunda pars, ed. P. Beato Reiser (Turin, Italy: Marietti, 1820), Q. XV, pp. 523-527. It should be noted that I am not concerned in this paper with describing either the psychological origin of the notion of substance, or of justifying it against phenomenalism. My only aim is to show how such a view of substance leads to a certain notion of form when it is applied, so to speak, to material objects. For an interesting account of the origin of the concept of substance in Poinsot see John Deely, Tractatus De Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot (Los Angeles, Berkeley, and London: The University of California Press, 1985), p. 86, n. 16. Deely takes it that Poinsot has a deeper categorial scheme than that of Aristotle from which the latter's scheme "emerges," as it were. In this article, then, I am not concerned with that deeper scheme which Deely refers to in this interesting note. 599 600 JOHN D. KRONEN in general and of its relation to the supposit and to the act of existing. He notes that by " substance " narrowly considered is meant that kind of essence to "which it is due to exist in itself as opposed to that kind to which it is due to exist in another" (i.e., an accident).2 He defends this as the primary " definition " 3 of substance against the other definition of it which is " that which stands under accidents," on the grounds that a thing must exist in itself, at least ontologically speaking, before it can support accidents 4 and that to define substance as that which supports accidents is to define it in relation to other things, not itself. This point is important because many modern and contemporary philosophers who have attacked the notion of substance have done so by arguing that there are no beings which stand under accidents. For Poinsot this attack, even if successful, would show that there are no accidents, not that there are no substances. Poinsot insists that " substance " connotes a quiddity to which to exist in itself is due since actual existence does not belong to the essence of any created thing.5 Further, Poinsot insists that to exist in itself " connotes more than a mere negation of existing in another; rather it connotes a positive perfection." This is because to exist in a dependent way is to exist in an imperfect way, so to exist independently must be to exist in a more perfect way.6 Finally, Poinsot distinguishes between the substance and the supposit. The substance is the complete nature of the thing, while 2 Ibid., p. 523. a " Substance " as a supreme genus cannot strictly be defined since it cannot be differentiated from any higher genus. 4 Haec autem proprietas existendi per se intelligitur vel secundum considerationem absolutam et in ordine ad se, et sic dicitur subsistens, quasi non indignes alio ut sustentetur, sed in se sistens; vel dicitur secundum habitudinem ad alia, quatenus ilia sustentat in esse, et sic dicitur non solum subsistens, sed etiam substans. Ibid., p. 523. 5 ••• esse actu per se vel in alio non est ipsa quidditas substantiae vel accidentis, quia esse seu existere in nulla quidditate creata... (shrink)

Obviously medicine should be evidence-based. The issues lie in the details: what exactly counts as evidence? Do certain kinds of evidence carry more weight than others? (And if so why?) And how exactly should medicine be based on evidence? When it comes to these details, the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement has got itself into a mess – or so it will be argued. In order to start to resolve this mess, we need to go 'back to basics'; and that means (...) turning to the philosophy of science. The theory of evidence, or rather the logic of the interrelations between theory and evidence, has always been central to the philosophy of science – sometimes under the alias of the 'theory of confirmation'. When taken together with a little philosophical commonsense, this logic can help us move towards a position on evidence in medicine that is more sophisticated and defensible than anything that EBM has been able so far to supply. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:OBJECT AND INTENTION IN MORAL JUDGMENTS ACCORDING TO AQUINAS JOHN FINNIS U'flkueTBity Oollege Unwersity of Oa:ford INTENTION IS OF END, choice is of means. A human aict ~s specified by (and s? is co.rrect:ly describe~ in terms of) its end. A human act IS specified by (and so Is correctly described in terms of) its object. An a:ct which is bad by reason of its object cannot be (...) justified by its end (its: good intention ). A human a:ct is specified by (and so is correctly described in iterms of) its intention.... Such a sequence of statements of St. Thomas ought to leave an impression of confusion. That impression would be heightened by the traditional representation of his analysis of acting in a schema of 12 terms signifying a sequence of psychological acts involved in willing and doing something. For in this analysis, intention seems to precede ·deliberating, judging, and choosing, and so, as deliberating, judging, and choosing often present themselves to consciousness distinctly, intention is presented in this analysis as if it were a distinct content of consciousness. When intention is so conceived, iit becomes possible to imagine that one can, so to speak, choose to direct (an) intention to or withhold it from the various aspects of one's chosen behavior, e.g. it.hose consequences which one foresees and welcomes or those one chooses to bring about onJ.y with regret. To some contemporary moralists, such approving or regretting of consequences is precisely what engages or disengages one's will and thus one's responsibility; what Christians or Jews used to regard as immoral can be uprightly done if done merely as a means to good ends and only with reluctance, I JOHN FINNIS regret, disapproval, i.e. if in no way approved or adopted as an end, i.e. if not really intended.1 Other modern moralists deny that one's responsibility for consequences of deliberate behavior can be so dependent on an inner ruct of intending (as distinct from the choosing and doing) ; they judge one responsible for everything one deliberately and with foresight causes.2 So they too reject the " doctrine " of double effect which Christian moralists had articulated as a development or codification of the elements of St. Thomas's discussion of self-defense, a disoussion whose first premise is that a human ad is specified (i.e. identified for the purposes of moral assessment) by its intention. Today there are other moralists again who combine the two foregoing lines of thought: they reject the doctrine of double effect as giving exaggernted importance to choice (means) over intention (end); one should take into account alil foreseeable consequences of one's chorce and ensure that it is likely to have a greater proportion of good than of bad consequences, and one must never approve (intend) any bad consequences -one may never deliberately cause them as ends hut only as means, means which one deliberwtely causes, not for their own sake, hut only for the sake of those proportionately greater good (or less bad) consequences which one does intend.8 1 Cf., e.g., Richard McCormick, S.J., "Medicaid and.Abortion," Theological Studies 45 (1984): 716-717. 2 Cf. Bruno Schueller, "The Double Effect in Catholic Thought: A Re· evaluation," in McCormick and Ramsey, Doimg Evil to Achieve Good (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978), 191: "... 'intend as a means' and 'permit', when referring to a non-moral evil, denote exactly the same mental attitude." Schueller, "La moraliM des moyens," Recherches de Science Religieuse 68 (1980) : 211 (causilng moral evil is never justified, causing non-moral evils is justified in pursuit of non-moral good of corresponding importance); 221· 2: "pour tous les biens dont la possession contribue au bien-etre de l'homme... [q]uoi que l'on choisisse... les consequences negatives qui resultent du choix sont un pur moyen en vue des consequences positives qui en resultent." s Cf. K.-H. Peschke, "Tragfaehigkeit und Grenzen des Prinzips der Doppelwirkung," Studia Moralia 26 (1988): 110-112, where Peschke states the "principle of double effect" (which he ascribes to Catholic theology and attacks ) in terms not of what is directly or... (shrink)

What is the relationship between saying ‘I know that Q’ and guaranteeing that Q? John Austin, Roderick Chisholm and Wilfrid Sellars all agreed that there is some important connection, but disagreed over what exactly it was. In this paper I discuss each of their accounts and present a new one of my own. Drawing on speech-act theory and recent research on the epistemic norms of speech acts, I suggest that the relationship is this: by saying ‘I know that Q’, (...) you represent yourself as having the authority to guarantee that Q. (shrink)

The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, Cambridge in 1988) monograph, “Representation & Reality”, which if correct, has important (...) implications for turing machine functionalism and the prospect of ‘conscious’ machines. In the paper, instead of seeking to develop Putnam’s claim that, “everything implements every finite state automata”, I will try to establish the weaker result that, “everything implements the specific machine Q on a particular input set (x)”. Then, equating Q (x) to any putative AI program, I will show that conceding the ‘strong AI’ thesis for Q (crediting it with mental states and consciousness) opens the door to a vicious form of panpsychism whereby all open systems, (e.g. grass, rocks etc.), must instantiate conscious experience and hence that disembodied minds lurk everywhere. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:TRANSCENDENTAL THOMISM AND THE THOMISTIC TEXTS JOHN F. x. KNASAS Genter for Thomistic Studies Houston, Temas SOME THIRTY YEARS ago in the journal Thought, there appeared an article by Fr. Joseph Donceel, S.J., entitled " A Thomistic Misapprehension? " Its thesis is that American Thomism had seen too much of the a posteriori in Aquinas's noetic.1 In fact the interpretation was so a posteriori that it bordered on (...) empiricism and positivism. Donceel intends to balance the American understanding of Aquinas by spotlighting various Thomistic texts that speak of an a priori contribution of the intellect to human knowledge. Donceel is merely calling attention to something that some outstanding European Thomists, e.g., Defever, Marechal, and Rahner have known for some time. Donceel's " balanced" interpretation is what is called Transcendental Thomism. In sum, the position claims that the human intellect is not so complete a tabula rasa that it fails to make an a priori contribution to the data of sensation. This contribution is the intellect's very dynamism to Infinite Being. The dynamism has a constitutive role in human experience. Swept up within this intellectual torrent, the data of sensation stand before us in consciousness as finite and limited. So " objectified " the data are disposed for the traditional abstvactive account of the specific and generic natures. After the Second Vatican Council, Thomism generally fell into disrepute among American Catholic intellectuals. Phi1 Joseph Donceel, " A Thomistic Misapprehension?" Thought, 32 (1957) : 189. 81 82 JOHN F. X. KNASAS losophy departments " pluralized." Their members represented analytic, existential, and process philosophy.2 If Thomism remained vibrant, it was in the a priori strain. Both on the philosophical and theological levels, it was at home with the pluralism tha.t marked the time.3 The current emphasis on political activism, however, ha:s caused even Transcendental Thomism to suffer an eclipse. In the heat of political struggle, Transcendental Thomism, too, appears decadent and bourgeois. The case can be made, though, that the uncovering of the intellect's a priori dynamism to the Infinite was a crucial move for liberationists. Gutierrez notes 4 that the Transcendental Thomist understanding of the human intellect posits a single finality for human nature. The traditional distinction between the temporal and eternal planes loses meaning. Human history becomes salvation history. In this way, then, Transcendental Thomism continues to exercise its influence. This paper investigates the purported Thomistic texts expressing an apriorism. The texts cited by Donceel are all found in Marechal's Cahier V.5 There MarechaI mentions many others besides. Hence, my paper will use the Marechalian collection. My treatment focuses upon the texts that are seemingly most a priori. I. A central text for Marechal is De Veritate, q.l, a.4, ad 5m (first set). Aquinas remarks: 2 See "Is a 'Catholic' Philosophy Department Possible? " by the Committee on Research (Thomas I.angan, K. I,. Schmitz, Jude P. Dougherty) of the ACPA (HJ78). 3 On Transcendental Thomism's capacity to admit a theological pluralism without falling into a relativism, see Gerald A. McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Gent1.ry (New York: The Seab1iry Pres8, 1977), pp. 258-9. 4 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, trans. by Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (New York: Orbis Books, 1973), p. 69. 5 Oahier V is a volume in Jl.riarechal's monumenfal Le point de depart de la metaphysique. Subsequent references to Oahier V are from Donceel's substantive translation A J,[wrechal Reader (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970). TRANSCENDENTAL THOMISM AND THE TEXTS 83 The truth by which the soul passes judgment on all things is the first truth; for, just as from the truth of the divine intellect there flow into the angelic intellects those: intelligible species by which angels know all things, so does the truth of the first principles by which we judge everything proceed from the truth of the divine intellect as from its exemplary cause. Since we can judge by means of the truth of these first principles only insofar as this truth is a likeness of the first truth, we are said to judge everything according to the first truth.6 The text illustrates a " dynamic exemplarism " in Aquinas... (shrink)

In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus (...) for prob(P/Q&R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability — nomic probability — there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r,s:a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&R) = Y(r,s:a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities.. (shrink)

Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons (CR): S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn‘t have if it weren‘t the case that P. Dretske develops an (...) analysis of knowing that centers on CR, and argues that the requirement undermines skepticism by implying the falsity of closure. We develop a Dretske-style analysis of knowing that incorporates CR, and we argue that this analysis not only accords with closure, but also implies it. In addition, we argue that the analysis accounts for the prima facie plausibility of closure-invoking skeptical arguments, and nonetheless implies that they are fallacious. If our arguments turn out to be sound, the acceptability of Dretske‘s analysis of knowing will be significantly enhanced by the fact that, despite implying closure, it undermines closure-based skepticism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Has Metaphysics to Do with Wisdom?John HaldaneThere are two loci of ambiguity in the title of the symposium from which this essay derives—"Is Belief in God Reasonable? Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles in a Contemporary Context."1 The first concerns the opening question, "is belief in God reasonable?" and the second the closing clause "in a contemporary context." I observe this not in the spirit of pedantry, but because (...) I want to consider certain interpretations of what is at issue, ones which may be different from those of other contributors but which are relevant to Aquinas's circumstances and interests and to ours. So far as the Summa contra gentiles [SCG] is concerned, I will touch mainly on issues discussed by Thomas at the outset of book I, in chapters 1–15, which deal with philosophical knowledge of first principles and arguments to the existence of God. First, however, the general issue of reasonable belief.IConcerning the first locus of ambiguity, the question of the reasonability of belief in God is multiply interpretable. It may be treated as relative to a subject's other beliefs and attitudes, where that subject e may be an individual or a group. Given that S believes p and q (and these can each be conjunctions of any number of propositions), is it reasonable for S to believe r? This aspect of relative credibility is itself ambiguous because it [End Page 1249] can be viewed narrowly, without regard to the status of those antecedent beliefs and attitudes, or broadly, as also asking whether those are themselves reasonable. In a court setting, for example, it may be asked whether it was reasonable for someone to have believed (or done) something given their antecedent beliefs, but it may well be countered that this is an insufficient standard of reasonability, since the prior attitudes may be incredible, or credible but irresponsibly held. The issue of reasonable belief, foresight and foreseeability are common courtroom examples.In these respects, then, it may be granted by someone A, who holds that believing in God is not reasonable, that it was nevertheless reasonable for S to do so given S's antecedent beliefs. This need not be a matter of condescension, however, since A may grant that the prior beliefs were themselves reasonable for S to hold, and would also have been reasonable by some more objective standard prevailing at the time or in the circumstances.A "rationalist" objector may counter, however, that this is all beside the point, since the question to consider is not the relative, but the absolute one: is belief in God reasonable? Full stop. I agree that there is nothing to be gained by unconstrained relativizing, but if "absolutism" is the implied contrast, it is over-stated. First, if reasonability is related to having (or having access to) reasons, and to the "quality" of those reasons, then some degree of relativity is entailed, and the only standard of reasonability that can be applied is a contextual one. To ask simpliciter whether it is reasonable to believe p carries an unacknowledged implicit reference either to something such as prevailing commonly held beliefs and associated normal cognitive processes or to an idealized thinker with access to relevant proofs or evidence. On further consideration, however, the latter, somewhat like Adam Smith's "impartial spectator" in ethics,2 tends just to be a more abstract version of the contextually reasonable thinker. There is perhaps a step beyond this, namely to the Omniscient Reasoner (OR) but it is a sophistical move, since it amounts to saying that a belief is reasonable if and only if it would be held by someone who knows everything relevant to its justification. which given that we cannot know antecedently the range of relevant considerations, is for us an inapplicably high standard. There is also some irony in asking if OR would judge belief in God Reasonable since OR would be God or at least God-like in respect of being all-knowing. [End Page 1250]IIThe other respect in which the question "is belief in God reasonable?" is ambiguous (in this first of the two areas ambiguity noted at the... (shrink)

First-order logic haslimitedexistential import: the universalized conditional ∀x[S(x) → P(x)] implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction ∃x[S(x) & P(x)] insome but not allcases. We prove theExistential-Import Equivalence:∀x[S(x) → P(x)] implies ∃x[S(x) & P(x)] iff ∃xS(x) is logically true.The antecedent S(x) of the universalized conditional alone determines whether the universalized conditionalhas existential import: implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction.Apredicateis a formula having onlyxfree. Anexistential-importpredicate Q(x) is one whose existentialization, ∃xQ(x), is logically true; otherwise, Q(x) isexistential-import-freeor simplyimport-free. Existential-import predicates are also said to beimport-carrying.How (...) widespread is existential import? How widespread are import-carrying predicates in themselves or in comparison to import-free predicates? To answer, let L be any first-order language with any interpretation INT in any [sc. nonempty] universe U. A subset S of U isdefinable inLunderINT iff for some predicate Q(x) in L, S is the truth-set of Q(x) under INT. S isimport-carrying definableiff S is the truth-set of an import-carrying predicate. S isimport-free definableiff S is the truth-set of an import-free predicate.Existential-Importance Theorem: Let L, INT, and U be arbitrary. Every nonempty definable subset of U isbothimport-carrying definableandimport-free definable.Import-carrying predicates are quite abundant, and no less so than import-free predicates. Existential-import implications hold as widely as they fail.A particular conclusion cannot be validly drawn from a universal premise, or from any number of universal premises.—Lewis-Langford, 1932, p. 62. (shrink)

This paper refutes two important and influential views in one fell stroke. The first is G.E. Moore’s view that assertions of the form ‘Q but I don’t believe that Q’ are inherently “absurd.” The second is Gareth Evans’s view that justification to assert Q entails justification to assert that you believe Q. Both views run aground the possibility of being justified in accepting eliminativism about belief. A corollary is that a principle recently defended by John Williams is also false, (...) namely, that justification to believe Q entails justification to believe that you believe Q. (shrink)

The argument presented in this paper is not a direct attack or defence of the Chinese Room Argument (CRA), but relates to the premise at its heart, that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, via the closely associated propositions that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax and that syntax is not intrinsic to physics. However, in contrast to the CRA’s critique of the link between syntax and semantics, this paper will explore the associated link between syntax and physics. The main (...) argument presented here is not significantly original – it is a simple reflection upon that originally given by Hilary Putnam (Putnam 1988) and criticised by David Chalmers and others: instead of seeking to justify Putnam’s claim that, “every open system implements every Finite State Automaton (FSA)”, and hence that psychological states of the brain cannot be functional states of a computer, I will seek to establish the weaker result that, over a finite time window every open system implements the trace of a particular FSA Q, as it executes program (p) on input (x). That this result leads to panpsychism is clear as, equating Q (p, x) to a specific Strong AI program that is claimed to instantiate phenomenal states as it executes, and following Putnam’s procedure, identical computational (and ex hypothesi phenomenal) states (ubiquitous little ‘pixies’) can be found in every open physical system. (shrink)

Early commentators and traditionists embed and amplify Q 2:102—an enigmatic allusion to angelic complicity in the transmission of esoteric knowledge to humankind—within a rich layer of interpretive lore frequently bearing the rubric “Tale of Hārūt and Mārūt.” A close study of this verse alongside its external narrative embellishments uncovers a wealth of structural and contextual motifs that suggestively link the “Tale” with biblical and parascriptural myths about “fallen angels” and their perceived role in the corruption of antediluvian humanity. The present (...) article catalogs a representative number of these motifs, speculates about their mode of transmission, and offers some guidelines for analyzing the different versions of the “Tale” that surface centuries later in medieval Jewish interpretive and mystical literature. Particular attention is devoted to unpacking the identity of the woman who is responsible for the seduction of the angels. (shrink)

Saul Kripke has made fundamental contributions to a variety of areas of logic, and his name is attached to a corresponding variety of objects and results. 1 For philosophers, by far the most important examples are ‘Kripke models’, which have been adopted as the standard type of models for modal and related non-classical logics. What follows is an elementary introduction to Kripke’s contributions in this area, intended to prepare the reader to tackle more formal treatments elsewhere.2 2. WHAT IS A (...) MODEL THEORY? Traditionally, a statement is regarded as logically valid if it is an instance of a logically valid form, where a form is regarded as logically valid if every instance is true. In modern logic, forms are represented by formulas involving letters and special symbols, and logicians seek therefore to define a notion of model and a notion of a formula’s truth in a model in such a way that every instance of a form will be true if and only if a formula representing that form is true in every model. Thus the unsurveyably vast range of instances can be replaced for purposes of logical evaluation by the range of models, which may be more tractable theoretically and perhaps practically. Consideration of the familiar case of classical sentential logic should make these ideas clear. Here a formula, say (p & q) ∨ ¬p ∨ ¬q, will be valid if for all statements P.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aquinas's Ethics beyond Thomistic Virtue Ethics:The Gifts of the Holy Spirit, Spiritual Instinct, and Complete Human PerfectionJohn BerkmanThis paper offers a new reading and interpretation of Aquinas's doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In the contemporary Thomist literature on ethics, there is far more discussion—and a far more developed discussion—of the nature and role of a virtue-habitus than a gift-habitus. Why might there be so little discussion (...) of the gifts and their distinctive habitus? Is it because Aquinas devotes many more questions to the virtues than to the gifts? Is it because the majority of self-professed Thomist ethicists have not been taught the gifts, and are either unaware or have merely a notional awareness that the gifts have a principle of action distinct from and superior to that of the virtues?1 Regardless of the reason, this paper seeks to mitigate the current paucity of analysis of the gifts and the gift-habitus.This paper will discuss Aquinas's doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit from a resolutely gift-centered perspective. I do so because discussions of the gifts often presume a virtue-centered perspective. That is, treatments of the gifts typically interpret what Aquinas says about the gifts through the lens of a pre-existing virtue framework, the gifts then being made to fit into that pre-existing framework. I will argue that we see this not only in interpretations of Aquinas on the gifts, but also in English translations of the Summa theologiae [ST] on the question of the gifts. [End Page 47]As a result, in contemporary scholarship on Aquinas's ethics, the virtues typically receive extended treatment, whereas the gifts of the Holy Spirit receive no treatment at all. And when the gifts are addressed, their treatment is brief, with the main point being that the gifts provide assistance to the virtues, like a spiritual butler. In the best-case scenario, the gifts are like Jeeves to the virtues' Bertie—undoubtedly wiser, but rarely listened to.The paper is divided into four sections. The first section compares and contrasts a gift-habitus and a vinue-habitus. The second section focuses on Aquinas's notion of instinctus. The instinct of the Holy Spirit (divine instinct) is the principle of motion Aquinas associates with the gifts of the Holy Spirit (ST I-II, q. 68, aa. 1–2). I argue that—contrary to the judgment of most commentators—instinctus is a highly appropriate term to describe the character of the work of the Holy Spirit. In this section I also show how Aquinas's doctrine of instinctus has been made "invisible" in part by various translations of the ST, including the translation of Fr. Shapcote.2In the third section, I analyze Aquinas' argument that the gifts are more perfective of human beings than the virtues (ST I-II, q. 68, a. 8). This analysis also constitutes a "case study" of the ways in which Shapcote's translation (the dominant English translation for the last hundred years) contributes to misunderstandings of Aquinas's views on the relationship between the gifts and the virtues. In comparing and contrasting the virtues and gifts, an original part of my argument is my claim that, while charity sometimes operates from a virtue-habitus, at other times it operates according to a gift-habitus. Commentators have failed to adequately account for the fact that truly perfect (simpliciter) charity cannot be attained solely by the operations of virtue. The ultimate expression of charity requires a habitus superior to a virtue-habitus.3 While the wayfarer's expression of charity is always in one [End Page 48] sense a gift from God, in that it relies on God's grace, as the wayfarer grows in charity, charity increasingly functions as a gift of the Holy Spirit, or perhaps the form of all the gifts.4The fourth and final section focuses on how the gifts and infused virtues operate in the wayfarer who is growing in spiritual maturity. I argue that, although infused virtue-habitus and gift-habitus are given at baptism, facility in either typically grows slowly. Increasing facility in... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON VIRTUE AND THE GOODS OF FORTUNE* JOHN BOWLIN University of Tulsa Tulsa, Oklahoma I T IS NOW commonplace to say that Aristotle considers good fortune useful, if not indispensable, for the acquisition and exercise of the virtues, and for the success of virtuous choices.1 Aquinas obviously draws upon Aristotle's treatment of the virtues as he develops his own, and yet he says relatively little about fortune's (...) influence upon the life of virtue.2 This reticence is puzzling, in part because it seems reasonable to expect that Aquinas would address a matter so central to an Aristotelian account of the virtues, but also because fortune's effect upon that account is hardly benign. If the life of virtue requires good fortune, then the voluntary character of virtuous habits and actions is threatened. And for someone with Aquinas's theological commitments the threat comes packaged with additional worries, equally troubling. For it implies that Providence, which governs fortune's ways (STh I, q. 116, a. 1), acts as fortune does, offering virtue and its benefits to some, while unjustly denying them to others. These are difficulties that cannot be escaped by ignoring 'A version of this paper was presented on 7 January 1994 in Chicago at the annual meeting of the Society of Christian Ethics. I would like to thank John Carmody, Victor Preller, Jeffrey Stout, and John Taylor for their comments and criticisms. The usual disclaimers apply. 1 See, e.g., Nancy Sherman, The Fabric ofCharacter: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), chapter 2. 2 Aquinas's interpreters have tended to say even less. For this reason I develop Aquinas's account of the relation between the virtues and the goods of fortune by looking to a number of recent interpretations of Aristotle's account. 537 538 JOHN BOWLIN them, or so it would seem. We must ask, therefore, whether Aquinas fails to see the problems that fortune creates for his treatment of the virtues, or, alternatively, whether his treatment of the virtues offers reasons that warrant his silence.3 Of course, there are multiple questions here insofar as fortune's potential influence upon the life of virtue is as complex as that life. Virtues are acquired, retained, and exercised, and fortune can affect each process in different ways, just as it can affect the success of virtuous choices. Add to this the fact that different virtues are subject to fortune in different ways and to different degrees and suddenly the possibilities for inquiry are vast. Indeed, the thought of undertaking a comprehensive inquiry tempts hubris. Mine will be more modest, asking simply this: what kind and what measure of external goods, those distributed by fortune, are required in order to pursue a life of virtue? l. REJECTED OPTIONS Aquinas lists the following external goods: wealth, power, honor, fame, a good country, a good name, and perhaps a few others (STh I-II, q. 2, a. 1-4; II-II, q. 108, a. 3).4 He considers them instrumental goods, which the virtuous must possess in some measure if they hope to achieve their ends consistently (STh I-II, q. 2, a. 1; II-II, q. 83, a. 6; q. 118, a. 1). He writes, "For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue" (STh I-II, q. 4, a. 7). Often their usefulness to the virtuous is direct, when, for example, they serve as a necessary instrument of a certain kind of virtuous action. The liberal, for instance, cannot successfully exercise their virtue without at least some wealth (STh II-II, q. 117, a. 3). In other contexts their usefulness is indirect, their aid to the virtuous mediated by some other condition. For instance, 3 Attending to Aquinas's silences is, of course, an effort inspired by Joseph Pieper's classic, The Silence of St. Thomas (New York: Pantheon, 1957). 4 I follow Aquinas and use "goods of fortune" and "external goods" interchangeably (STh I-II, q. 2, a. 4). AQUINAS ON... (shrink)

Contrary to common misconceptions, today's logic is not devoid of existential import: the universalized conditional ∀ x [S→ P] implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction ∃ x [S & P], not in all cases, but in some. We characterize the proexamples by proving the Existential-Import Equivalence: The antecedent S of the universalized conditional alone determines whether the universalized conditional has existential import, i.e. whether it implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction.A predicate is an open formula having only x free. An existential-import predicate (...) Q is one whose existentialization, ∃ x Q, is logically true; otherwise, Q is existential-import-free or simply import-free.How abundant or widespread is existential import? How abundant or widespread are existential-import predicates in themselves or in comparison to import-free predicates? We show that existential-import predicates are quite abundant, and no less so than import-free predicates. Existential.. (shrink)